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One of the central aspects of the nouveau roman, the most important French literary 
movement of the 1950s and 1960s, was the way in which it questioned the idea of 
the novel as storytelling. The nouveaux romanciers, such as Alain Robbe-Grillet, 
Nathalie Sarraute and Claude Simon, wanted to bring forth the ideological question-
ability of narrativity epitomized by what they called “Balzacian realism” – in terms 
of which, they felt, the novel as a genre was still viewed and assessed. However, 
after this period of radical problematization, a rehabilitation of storytelling is visible 
in the French novel of the 1970s – a shift that some scholars have characterized 
as the “return of the narrative” or as “re-narratization of the novel” (see e.g. Kibedi 
Varga 1988, 38; Gratton 1997, 248; cf. Davis & Fallaize 2000, 14–15). In my article, 
I would like to shed some light on this “narrative turn” by arguing that it can be seen 
as a turn towards a fundamentally hermeneutic view of the narrative mediatedness 
of our relation to the world. As my primary example I will use Michel Tournier who 
has been mentioned as a major representative of this turn (Kibedi Varga 1988, 38; 
Gratton 1997, 248) but whose precise contribution to it has not yet been examined.
Problematization of storytelling in 
the nouveau roman
First, I will have a brief look at why the nouveaux romanciers rejected the idea of 
the novel as storytelling or as “narration of a succession of fictional events” (to 
use Rimmon-Kenan’s (1988, 2) definition of ‘narrative fiction’). A central motivation 
for this rejection was the idea that storytelling creates a false illusion of the intel-
ligibility, coherence, and meaningfulness of reality. In other words, the nouveaux 
romanciers repudiate storytelling in the name of a new realism, that is, in order to 
bring forth the fundamentally chaotic, fragmentary nature of reality. Thus, although 
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they renounce realistic ideology, they still endeavour to say something about the 
human situation in the world. As Simon (1986, 86) puts it, what unites the nouveaux 
romanciers is the experience of the fundamental uncertainty of everything, that 
is, of “constantly treading on quicksand”. Similarly, Sarraute (1963, 435; 2002, 10) 
sees storytelling as a convention that masks the way in which reality is in a state of 
constant transformation; and Robbe-Grillet writes in his essay collection For a New 
Novel (Pour un nouveau roman, 1963):
All the technical elements of the narrative – systematic use of the past tense and the 
third person, unconditional adoption of chronological development, linear plots […] 
etc. – everything tended to impose the image of a stable, coherent, continuous, un-
equivocal, entirely decipherable universe (Robbe-Grillet 1989, 32).
By contrast, the nouveau roman is based on the experience of fragmentary, fleeting 
reality that, to put it in Robbe-Grillet’s (1989, 21) terms, “refuses to conform to 
our habits of apprehension and to our classification”. Robbe-Grillet underlines that 
reality is totally foreign to man; in his famous words, “Man looks at the world, and 
the world does not look back at him” (Robbe-Grillet 1989, 58).
Although the nouveaux romanciers renounced the existentialist idea of commit-
ment, there are many other respects in which Jean-Paul Sartre and Albert Camus 
were important forerunners for them.1 Sartre and Camus, too, view reality as funda-
mentally non-human and reject storytelling because stories impose false order on 
reality. Sartre (1950, 167) argues that his generation can no longer accept the way 
in which narratives present reality as if already understood and ordered, ignoring 
“its ambiguity, its unforeseeability”; “the narrative explicates and coordinates at the 
same time as it describes, it substitutes a causal order for chronological connections” 
(Sartre 1947, 121). Similarly, in Nausea (La Nausée, 1938), Roquentin suggests 
that it is false and dishonest to mould life into stories and adventures. There is a 
fundamental opposition between living and storytelling, but we are so entangled in 
stories that we deceive ourselves and fail to make this distinction clearly:
[F]or the most commonplace event to become an adventure, you must – and this is all 
that is necessary – start recounting it. This is what fools people: a man is always a teller 
of tales, he lives surrounded by his stories and the stories of others, he sees everything 
that happens to him through them; and he tries to live his life as if he were recounting 
it. But you have to choose: to live or to recount (Sartre 1965, 61).2
1 Robbe-Grillet (see e.g. 2001, 239–262) acknowledges this, especially in his later essays. On 
the relation between the existentialist notion of political commitment and the nouveaux romanciers’ 
notion of “literary commitment”, see Meretoja (2004a, 122–131). 
2 “Voici ce que j’ai pensé: pour que l’évenement le plus banal devienne une aventure, il faut et il 
suffit qu’on se mette à le raconter. C’est ce qui dupe les gens: un homme, c’est toujours un conteur 
d’histoires, il vit entouré de ses histoires et des histoires d’autrui, il voit tout ce qui lui arrive à traverse 
elles; et il cherche à vivre sa vie comme s’il la racontait. Mais il faut choisir: vivre ou raconter” (Sartre 
1978, 61–62).
Narrative Turn in the French Novel
99
However, in Robbe-Grillet’s opinion Sartre and Camus failed to distance them-
selves radically enough from anthropomorphism. To his mind, Camus’s concept 
of the absurd, for example, gives a tragic, profound meaning to the strangeness 
of the world. By contrast, Robbe-Grillet (1989, 19) writes: “But the world is neither 
significant nor absurd. It is, quite simply.”3 Simon grants this phrase his unreserved 
approval (Lebrun 1989, 39), and in his Nobel Lecture he paraphrases it as follows: 
“[I]n a word, I’ve been about the world ... all, however, without finding any sense to 
all this, unless it should be the one assigned to it, I believe, by Barthes, following 
Shakespeare: that ‘if the world signifies anything, it is that it signifies nothing’ – except 
that it exists” (Simon 1993, 70). Moreover, Robbe-Grillet (1984, 212/1988, 149) 
demands that the novel should give up – more radically than the existentialists – “the 
universe of meanings (psychological, social, functional)”, because “reality begins 
at the precise moment when meaning becomes uncertain”. In fact, Robbe-Grillet 
has expressed on numerous occasions his suspicion and even hostility towards 
meaning in general: “My greatest enemy, perhaps my only enemy, already for a 
long time has been meaning in general” (Ricardou 1976, 36). And in an interview 
he states: “The Real Is Everything Outside Meaning. The familiar, the constituted 
(world/text), is ideological, a cultural and linguistic construction. The real is what is 
outside this” (Ramsay 1992, 245).
In light of statements like these, it is questionable to regard Robbe-Grillet as 
a phenomenological novelist, as he himself and many scholars have done (see 
e.g. Robbe-Grillet 2001, 241–249; Laaksonen 1993, 273–274; Carrabino 1974; 
Morrissette 1963, Bernal 1964; Stoltzfus 1964; Sturrock 1969; Allemand 1997). 
Namely, phenomenologists from Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger to Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty and Sartre agree that it is senseless to posit a sharp opposition 
between meanings and reality since reality is always given to us in some sense, that 
is, interpreted and opened up from a certain horizon of meaning. As Sartre (1996, 
76) notes: “There is no other universe than a human universe, a universe of human 
subjectivity”. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty (1962, xix) asserts, “we are condemned to 
meaning”; and Camus (1942, 32) contends: “In order to understand the world, man 
must transform it into human, he must impress his own stamp on it. […] The old 
truth ‘all thinking is anthropomorphic’ has precisely this meaning”.
In his novels (especially in his first four novels), Robbe-Grillet endeavours to 
avoid narrativity and meaning-giving as far as possible by focusing on the descrip-
tion of physical objects, often in a geometrical fashion, as in the following example 
from his novel In the Labyrinth (Dans le labyrinthe, 1959): 
[A] square of varnished wood, as sharp as if drawn with a ruler, thus occupies the rear 
left-hand corner of the table, not in the angle itself but parallel to the edges, about four 
3 From a Heideggerian perspective, for example, this view is, of course, highly questionable: in 
his Sein und Zeit Heidegger (2001, 2–4) argues that the question concerning ‘Being’ is not the 
simplest but the most profound and complex question. Below, I will deal more extensively with the 
hermeneutic view of the human mode of being.
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inches from them. The square itself measures some six by six inches (Robbe-Grillet 
1967, 10).4 
As we can see, the objects of description are not interpreted from any individually 
constituted personal perspective: they are not related to anyone’s life situation or 
life history, nor even to the human world of purposes and meanings in general. 
Robbe-Grillet (1989, 39) describes this mode of description as an attempt to cleanse 
things “from systematic romanticism […] so that at last they could be merely what 
they are”; and he regards sight as the “privileged sense” because of its “cleansing 
power”: it “leaves things in their respective place”, thereby enhancing “rejection of 
all complicity” with the world (Robbe-Grillet 1989, 72–73). 
The opposition between things as they are “in themselves” and conventional 
notions of reality is central to all the nouveaux romanciers, and it is connected to 
their attempt to displace storytelling by description of internal or external reality 
in its immediacy (see e.g. Ricardou & Rossum-Guyon 1972b, 53; Sarraute 1963, 
432–433; Robbe-Grillet 2001, 329). Sarraute’s novels concentrate on the de-
scription of what she calls “tropisms”, that is, the anonymous, pre-linguistic inner 
movements of the psyche. Instead of telling stories and portraying characters her 
novels attempt to describe “a substance as anonymous as blood, a magma without 
name or contours” (Sarraute 2002, 76). Simon, on the other hand, is a self-declared 
materialist – “Grosso modo, je suis matérialiste” (Lebrun 1989, 40) – who endeav-
ours to bring forth, similarly to Robbe-Grillet, the solid materiality of the world. He 
sees himself as one of the modern novelists who are carrying out the prediction 
made by Tynianov of “a future form of the novel in which ‘the story would be no 
more than the pretext for an accumulation of descriptions’” (Duncan 1985, 14).
Robbe-Grillet and Simon acknowledge that reality as such cannot be made im-
mediately available in literature, as it is built of language which already represents 
artificial ordering of things, but they think they can come nearest to this goal by 
describing only concrete, particular visual perceptions without abstract concep-
tualization, as if without or before giving meaning to these perceptions (see e.g. 
Lebrun 1989, 38, 40; Robbe-Grillet 1989, 107).5 Simon speaks of resorting to the 
“primordial, elementary” (Lebrun 1989, 38), and Robbe-Grillet calls for observation 
which “consists of description without interpretation, without giving any meanings to 
things” (Bourdet 1959, 132). Underlying these views, however, there is an empiricist, 
positivistic way of identifying a certain way of relating to reality with the ontological 
nature of reality per se. From a phenomenological or hermeneutic perspective it is 
evident that the geometrical visual mode of description also represents only one 
human way of interpreting reality.
4 “[C]omme tracé au tire-ligne, un carré de bois verni occupe ainsi le coin arrière-gauche, non pas 
à l’angle même de la table, mais parallèlement à ses bords, en retrait d’environ dix centimètres. Le 
carré lui-même mesure une quinzaine de centimètres de côté” (Robbe-Grillet 1959, 12).
5 Robbe-Grillet (1989, 166) differentiates between ”various levels of signification of language” and 
thinks that narration that focuses on describing only concrete, particular visual perceptions of things 
here and now “humanizes” reality less than other forms of narration. 
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Dismantling the myth of Naturalness 
in the nouveau roman
For the nouveaux romanciers, however, the question concerning the chaotic nature 
of reality and the narrative order imposed on it was not only an ontological and 
epistemological question but also an ethical one. This ethical dimension should 
be understood in relation to the crisis of humanism after the Second World War. 
Modern Western humanism was based on the idea of an autonomous, individual 
subject which encounters the world as objects. Already Friedrich Nietzsche and 
the early Heidegger brought forward the problematic nature of this subject-object 
opposition, but it was not until the postwar period that its entire ethical weight 
emerged. Thinkers such as Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer argued that the 
relation of the modern subject to its objects implies a power relation that eventually 
leads to the conquest and oppression of not only the world but also of the subject 
itself (Adorno and Horkheimer 1998, 19–60).6 Also many French intellectuals 
continued, in the footsteps of Nietzsche and Heidegger, the critique of European 
rationalism and humanism, whereby they also brought forward the ethically 
problematic nature of narrative order (see Gibson 1996, 185–186). For example, 
Emmanuel Levinas declared that narrative order freezes time and turns it into fixed 
images, representations that imply evasion of initiative and responsibility: “By its 
reflection in a narrative, being has a non-dialectical fixity, stops dialectics and time” 
(Levinas 1998, 139). Later, philosophers from Michel Foucault to Jean-François 
Lyotard questioned the opposition between scientific and narrative knowledge and 
stressed the way in which narratives imply totalizing conceptual appropriation of 
their subject matter: “The narrative function […] acts as if the occurrence, with its 
potentiality of differends, could come to completion, or as if there were a last word” 
(Lyotard 1988, 151; see also Lyotard 1986, 23).7 
It is as part of this tradition that we should see also the nouveaux romanciers, 
who considered Western humanism’s idea of man as a master of the universe to 
be in part responsible for the atrocities of the Second World War (cf. Duncan 1985, 
14; Lebrun 1989, 38; Robbe-Grillet 2001, 570). They renounce the modern subject 
who takes possession of the world by imposing a meaningful order upon it, and 
they see storytelling as a central means whereby such an order has been projected 
into the world (see e.g. Robbe-Grillet 1989, 29, 32).
6 See Menke (2003, 258–259) on how not only Adorno and Horkheimer but also later Heidegger, 
Hannah Arendt, and Michel Foucault saw a more or less direct connection between the structure of 
modern subjectivity and the development of modern society that culminated in Nazism. 
7 In the Anglo-American world, Hayden White has attacked narrativity on similar grounds as the 
French postwar thinkers. For example, he argues that the narrative “reveals to us a world that is 
putatively ‘finished,’ done with, over” (White 1981, 20) and that the “value attached to narrativity in 
the representation of real events arises out of a desire to have real events display the coherence, 
integrity, fullness, and closure of an image of life that is and can only be imaginary” (White 1981, 
23). In his argumentation, he relies on similar positivistic assumptions as e.g. Robbe-Grillet, as he 
asserts: “Real events should simply be; […] they should not pose as tellers of a narrative” (White 
1981, 4; cf. Robbe-Grillet 1989, 19).
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Especially Robbe-Grillet’s writings bring forth the ethical questionableness of 
narrative order. It is questionable not only because it masks the chaotic and unat-
tainable nature of reality but also because of its oppressiveness. According to him, 
order in general implies forcing reality under artificial, oppressive labels: as an 
example he mentions the way the Nazis classified people into different ”races” 
(Robbe-Grillet 1984, 120, 126). Robbe-Grillet tells in his autobiographical novel Ghosts 
in the Mirror (Le miroir qui revient, 1984) that his whole adult life has been marked 
by a fundamental suspicion of order, which stems from his adolescent experiences 
of Nazism. Nazi Germany lured his parents precisely as a political system repre-
senting utmost order; and after the war he was struck by terror as he heard about 
the reverse side of this order with the concentration camps. He maintains that this 
experience resulted in an aspiration to fight against order, for disorder and freedom. 
(Robbe-Grillet 1984, 46, 118–122, 129–132; see also Laaksonen 1993, 267). 
Accordingly, Robbe-Grillet demands that the visual descriptions of the object 
world should not create an order that pretends to mimic a pre-existing order found 
in reality. Instead, they are to constitute a “double movement of creation and de-
struction”: successive descriptions must undermine and cancel each other out so 
that the novel displays the arbitrary and constructed character of the narrative 
orders it creates (Robbe-Grillet 1989, 147–148). In his novels, this can be seen in 
the manner in which the various textual series contradict each other and refuse to 
form a coherent fictive world, thereby underscoring their constructed, non-natural 
character. According to Robbe-Grillet, what makes the “new novels” subversive is 
precisely the awareness of their own non-naturalness: 
[F]or the first time a mode of production declares itself non-natural; and I think this 
is extremely important, because, as you know, the myth of naturalness has served 
the establishment and preservation of an entire social, moral and political order. The 
bourgeois order, the bourgeois morality, the bourgeois values were taken as natural, 
that is, inscribed in the order of things, and therefore just, innocent and definitive. And 
the same is true of narrative order (Robbe-Grillet 1972, 159).
Thus, although he does not believe in the possibility of totally transcending human 
symbolic orders, Robbe-Grillet thinks it is important to try to shatter and decon-
struct them as far as possible so as to disclose their nature as human construc-
tions. He holds that the central task of the nouveau roman is to show that “there 
is no natural order, no moral, political or narrative, there are only human orders, 
created by men, which are necessarily provisory and arbitrary” (Robbe-Grillet 1972, 
160).8 According to him, in our time, “to tell a story has become strictly impossible” 
8 From this viewpoint Robbe-Grillet claims that the nouveau roman is fighting for a general “revo-
lution of meaning” which is more fundamental than a revolution restricted to the economic structures 
of society (Ricardou & Rossum-Guyon 1972a, 174). This manner of thinking aligns Robbe-Grillet 
with the members of the Tel Quel, who also combated “the principle of naturalness” (Kristeva 1969, 
212, 244; see also Sollers 1970, 76).
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precisely because it creates a false illusion of a pre-existing natural order that the 
text represents (Robbe-Grillet 1989, 33).
By the fragmentary and contradictory structure of his novels, Robbe-Grillet aims 
to upset automatic processes of meaning-giving, to ensure that meanings remain “in 
movement”, and to bring forth the instability, temporariness and non-naturalness of 
each meaningful order (cf. Laaksonen 1993, 271). As the novels refuse to offer the 
reader a ready-made order, they demand his or her active participation in making 
sense of the text. Robbe-Grillet (1989, 156) asserts that they thereby encourage 
the reader not only to invent the text at hand but also “to invent his own life” – an 
idea that resembles remarkably the late Foucault’s (1983, 236–237) ”aesthetics of 
existence”, that is, his idea that we should “create ourselves as a work of art”.9 
Before moving on to the rehabilitation of storytelling after the heyday of the 
nouveau roman, it should be noted that the nouveau roman did not actually totally 
dispense with narrativity; rather, it problematized it and brought forward the con-
structedness and non-naturalness of narratives.10 The stories told by the nouveau 
roman are fragmented, discontinuous and contradictory, and they are often difficult 
to abstract from the textual level of narration.11 Thereby they question the idea that 
stories would recount events that are ontologically prior to the act of narration.12 
Furthermore, they draw attention to the fact that narratives do not reflect order 
found in the world independent of man; instead, they are ideologically charged 
human constructions devoid of any naturalness or innocence.
Hermeneutic rehabilitation of Narrativity
At the turn of the 1960s and 1970s many French novelists (such as Michel Tournier, 
Jean-Marie Gustave Le Clézio, Patrick Modiano, Tahar Ben Jelloun) started to 
question the way in which the nouveau roman had banned storytelling. Their dis-
comfort with the “against narrative” movement of the nouveau roman stemmed 
from their different views on reality and human existence: namely, they do not shun 
9 In both Robbe-Grillet’s and Foucault’s case, however, the plea for the subject’s self-creation 
seems to be in tension with other aspects of their thought that stress the subject’s profound 
powerlessness.
10 Robbe-Grillet (1989, 33) actually admits this in some passages, for example when he writes 
that in the modern novel “it is not the anecdote that is lacking, it is only its character of certainty, its 
tranquillity, its innocence”.
11 Most theories of narrative rely on the distinction between the story and its discursive representa-
tion: for Russian Formalists, the fabula and the sjuzet, for Genette (1972, 71–76), histoire and récit, 
and for Rimmon-Kenan (1988, 3), story and text. Usually the term ‘narrative’ is taken to include the 
discursive representation of the story. Sturgess argues that the story and its discursive representa-
tion should be seen as two aspects of the narrative, and he points out that although there are novels 
(such as Robbe-Grillet’s) “whose fabulae seem difficult or impossible to reconstruct”, the distinction 
 “allows us to establish this impossibility” (Sturgess 1992, 11, 29). On defining narrative see also 
Abbott (2002, 12–23), who reminds us that there are different degrees of narrativity. 
12 Cf. Rimmon-Kenan (1996, 8) who points out that formalist and structuralist conceptions of 
narrative “grant the events a logical priority over their telling”. 
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the idea of literature as storytelling, because for them narrativity is something that 
characterizes human experience in general, that is, our temporal manner of shaping 
reality and constructing our identities. Michel Tournier is the author who has articu-
lated most clearly such a view in his theoretical essays, in which he underscores 
the role of culturally mediated narratives in constituting human existence: 
Man is nothing but a mythical animal. He becomes man – he acquires a human being’s 
sexuality and heart and imagination – only by virtue of the murmur of stories and kalei-
doscope of images that surround him in the cradle and accompany him all the way to 
the grave (Tournier 1988, 158–159).13
By myths Tournier means cultural narratives on the basis of which we give shape 
and form to our experiences and aspirations (Tournier 1988, 158). For him narratives 
do not represent false ideology from which literature should be cleansed in the 
name of truth but something completely real that constitutes our way of being in the 
world: they form the medium through which we interpret ourselves and the world 
we encounter. This view can be characterized as hermeneutic, for the basic tenet 
of hermeneutic philosophy is the cultural-historical mediatedness of our relation 
to the world and to ourselves (see e.g. Ricoeur 1991a, 15–18; Gadamer 1993, 
121–132; Figal 2001, 103).14 As Paul Ricoeur (1991a, 15), the most prominent 
French hermeneuticist, puts it: ”There is no self-understanding that is not mediated 
by signs, symbols, and texts.” Similarly, the Canadian hermeneuticist Charles 
Taylor (1985, 45, 47) echoes Tournier’s views by arguing that “human beings are 
self-interpreting animals”, that is, beings constituted in the process in which they 
interpret themselves and the world.
From the hermeneutic perspective, the nouveaux romanciers – insofar as they 
reject storytelling in order to disclose the fundamentally discontinuous, fragmentary, 
and chaotic nature of reality – hang onto a positivistic idea according to which the 
 “real” is only that which is independent of human meaning-giving processes. By 
contrast, the hermeneuticists consider also the human experience of the world to 
be real, and largely narrative in form. 
Of the contemporary hermeneuticists, Ricoeur is the one who has explicated 
most clearly the idea that “our existence cannot be separated from the stories 
that we tell of ourselves” (Ricoeur 1981, 156). He has built his theory of narrative 
identity first and foremost on the basis of Martin Heidegger’s and Hannah Arendt’s 
thinking (cf. Ricoeur 1985, 442). One of the central ideas of Heidegger’s Sein und 
Zeit is that the human mode of being, Dasein, is characterized by an understanding 
13 In the English-speaking world, Paul Auster has expressed similar ideas. He writes, for example: 
 “I believe that stories are the fundamental food for the soul. We can’t live without stories. In one 
form or another, everybody lives on them from the age of two until their death” (Auster 1997, 336). 
 “A child’s need for stories is as fundamental as his need for food, and it manifests itself in the same 
way hunger does” (Auster 1992, 154).
14 Gadamer (1997, 302, passim) stresses that this cultural-historical mediatedness of our mode of 
being entails a fundamental finitude of our self-understanding. 
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of one’s own being which differentiates it fundamentally from the “being-at-hand”, 
Vorhandensein, of mere things: this is why “selfhood must be conceived existen-
tially”, that is, as a temporal process of constant reinterpretation, and not in terms 
of a substantial fundament, subjectum, that lies under or behind the continuum of 
experiences (Heidegger 2001, 114, 317–318). Arendt, on the other hand, expounds 
the link between narrativity and identity: “Who somebody is or was we can know 
only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero” (Arendt 1998, 186).
Ricoeur develops further Arendt’s ideas on narrative identity in two significant 
ways that bring him close to Tournier’s views. Firstly, he analyses how we con-
stantly reinterpret our identities in the light of stories handed down to us by the 
cultural tradition: “This refiguration makes this life itself a cloth woven of stories told” 
(Ricoeur 1988, 246/Ricoeur 1985, 443; see also Ricoeur 1991b, 437). Secondly, 
he analyses how narrativity and experience – or action and narration that gives it 
meaning – are always already entwined in such a way that renders problematic the 
distinction that Arendt makes between the actor or protagonist of a life story and its 
narrator/author: ”Even though stories are the inevitable results of action, it is not the 
actor but the storyteller who perceives and ‘makes’ the story” (Arendt 1998, 192). 
By contrast, Ricoeur (1985, 443) sees life and stories we tell about it intertwined in 
a way which entitles us to say, following Marcel Proust (see 1954, 1033), that we 
are both readers and writers of our own lives.
Ricoeur agrees with Arendt that the individual cannot create his life story at will: 
 “Because the actor always moves among and in relation to other acting beings, he 
is never merely a ‘doer’ but always and at the same time a sufferer” (Arendt 1998, 
190). However, where Arendt (1998, 184) draws the conclusion that “nobody is the 
author or producer of his own life story”, Ricoeur (1991b, 437) suggests that we 
can “learn to become the narrator of our own story without completely becoming 
the author of our life”. In other words, one can learn to interpret, give meaning and 
shape to the events of one’s life story, although one cannot function as the sole 
source of its meaning. By taking this role one can make oneself into a “co-author” 
of one’s life as far as its meaning is concerned (Ricoeur 1990, 191).15 Narrative 
reinterpretation of one’s life implies not seeing it as a mere sequence of events 
but, instead, positing oneself as its responsible subject. By structuring his life into a 
story of which he can take responsibility, the individual can find out who he is and 
who he wants to be (Ricoeur 1991b, 434–436; Ricoeur 1983, 142–144; Ricoeur 
1990, 190–193). 
According to Ricoeur (1983, 105–162), narrativization of life is about emplotment 
(dénouement), by way of which life is restructured, refigurated, through culturally 
15 Ricoeur has borrowed the concept of “co-author” from Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, 213) but wishes 
to distance his own theory of narrative identity from that of MacIntyre who believes that “stories are 
lived before they are told” and sees life histories as “enacted dramatic narratives” (MacIntyre 1984, 
212, 215). Ricoeur (1990, 188), by contrast, stresses the difference between life and fiction and 
agrees with Louis O. Mink that “stories are not lived but told”. For him, the narrativization of life 
is a process of interpreting it narratively – and of refiguring it in the light of fictional and historical 
narratives (see Ricoeur 1990, 186–190).
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mediated narrative models. He sees emplotment in terms of bringing together order 
and disorder that shape our lives: through it meaningful continuity is built into life, but 
the resulting narrative is characterized by not only concordance but also discordance, 
discontinuity and disorder (see Ricoeur 1983, 86–92, 139–140; Ricoeur 1984, 13, 
22–23, 50–58, 291–293). As we tell stories of our lives we mould situations and 
events that we have encountered into a meaningful order, the continuum of our lives, 
but on the other hand the way in which we understand this continuum is constantly 
open to challenges posed by new situations. To sum up, for Ricoeur, narrativity 
points to the human way of shaping experiences into a meaningful temporal 
continuum, and he sees, on the basis of this narrativity, identity as a dynamic 
temporal process constituted in the continuous reinterpretation of cultural narratives.
Tournier sees the significance of literature in its very ability to tell stories on the 
basis of which we can find new ways of shaping our identities and our relation to 
the world and to other people. He mentions as examples of literature’s transforma-
tive capacity the way in which “Rousseau invented the beauty of the mountains” 
and “Goethe, who in creating Werther in 1774 also created romantic love” which 
still continues to shape decisively the way people experience love today (Tournier 
1988, 160). Accordingly, for Tournier the fundamental task of the novelist is to 
renew the cultural stock of narratives in such a way that it can nourish his or her 
contemporaries: “The artist’s ambition is to add to or at any rate modify the ‘murmur’ 
of myth that surrounds the child, the pool of images in which his contemporaries 
move – in short, the oxygen of the soul” (Tournier 1988, 159–160).
In accordance with Ricoeur’s views, Tournier sees a dialectical relationship 
between the cultural tradition and the individual who interprets his or her life in the 
light of culturally mediated stories. Thus, they both question the sharp dichotomy 
(postulated e.g. by Sartre’s Roquentin) between life and storytelling.16 We are 
entangled in stories from the day we are born and we constantly reinterpret our 
lives through them. The stories handed down to us by the cultural tradition, in turn, 
are moulded by individual reinterpretations of the old stories.
For Tournier, the novelist does not create new narratives in a vacuum but instead 
in relation to the literary tradition. His work is a matter of critical rewriting and re-
interpreting the already written in such a way that can shed new light on old stories 
as well as provide new models of sense-making. This manner of thinking finds 
expression in the form of his novels, namely, in the way in which they are woven 
intertextually on the basis of old narratives. For example, his first novel, Friday 
(Vendredi ou les limbes du Pacifique, 1967) is a critical rewriting of the story of 
Robinson Crusoe that has occupied a central position as part of the mytho-poetic 
basis of the Western world ever since Daniel Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe (1719).17 
16 A similar dichotomy characterizes also the thinking of many philosophers of history, such as that 
of Hayden White, who constantly draws on the opposition between the reality of historical events 
and the narratives that impose on them the form of a story (see White 1981, 2–5, 19–23).
17 According to Ricoeur (1991a, 482–483), each society is based on a “hidden mytho-poetic 
nucleus”, which consists of its foundational myths and narratives. On Friday as a critical rewriting of 
Defoe’s novel, see Saariluoma 1992, 58–96; Saariluoma 1998, 105–125.
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As the name of the novel already suggests, Tournier’s novel accords Friday a 
subject position that he was denied in Defoe’s novel. The novel depicts the process 
whereby Robinson gradually emancipates himself from the manipulative life form of 
the colonialist West through encountering the other, that is, by learning to relate to 
Friday as his equal partner. Thus, a central theme of the novel is the hermeneutic 
idea that “self-understanding always occurs through understanding something other 
than the self” (Gadamer 1997, 97). Before Friday arrives at the island Robinson 
notes that his entire world is falling apart without the presence of another human 
being: “The other, a major constituent of my world… I measure each day what I 
owed him as I register new fissures in my personal edifice”.18 Tournier contends 
that Friday is not an anthropological novel of the encounter of two civilisations but a 
philosophical novel on the “corrosive effects of inhuman solitude” and on the way in 
which Friday serves as “both guide and midwife” to the transformation of Robinson 
into a “new man” (Tournier 1988, 190–191).19
Encountering Friday as another subject enables Robinson to gain distance to 
the life form of his native country, largely based on the exploitation of nature and 
other people; the social order that he customarily identifies with “civilization” as 
such becomes relativized and loses its aura of superiority (Tournier 1984, 146–147, 
243). Thereby Robinson finds a novel, less violent way of relating to the world. As 
part of this process, his sexuality abandons “the bed prepared for it in advance by 
society” (Tournier 1984, 119) and manifests itself as “gentle jubilation that envelops 
me and bears me from head to toe as long as the sun-god bathes me in its rays” 
(Tournier 1984, 229–230). In sum, this counter-narrative questions not only the 
heteronormativity but also the naturalness of the dominant Western social order 
in general; it renders visible the capitalist, individualist and colonialist ideological 
bearings of Defoe’s Robinson Crusoe and encourages the reader to ask to what 
extent they still define the Western way of life.
The idea of literature as a rewriting of culturally mediated narratives has been 
central also in the so-called post-colonial literature, for example in the novels of 
Tahar Ben Jelloun, a prominent French author emigrated from Morocco. Starting 
from the beginning of the 1970s, he has written novels that – drawing from the 
Arab oral tradition as well as from the formal experiments of European modernism – 
thematize the central role of narratives in the constitution of identity. In his first 
novel, Harrouda (1973), he reinterprets the myth, rooted in Moroccan folklore, of a 
magical woman figure Harrouda. The protagonist of the novel is a young boy trying 
to discover his identity and sexuality in relation to this mythical embodiment of 
subversion and transformation, a prostitute who defies the taboos of the repressive, 
patriarchal society. Whereas the traditional Maghrebian city of Fes functions as 
the main setting of Harrouda, since his second novel, La réclusion solitaire (1976), 
18 “Autrui, pièce maîtresse de mon universe… Je mesure chaque jour ce que je lui devais en 
enregistrant de nouvelles fissures dans mon édifice personnel” (Tournier 1984, 53).
19 This line of interpretation has been elaborated by Gilles Deleuze (1969, 360–361) who argues 
that the absence of another human being is the most central question of Tournier’s Friday.
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Ben Jelloun starts dealing with the situation of Arabian immigrants in France. As 
Spiller (2000, 193–195) puts it, his novels are laboratories of the “entre-deux” in 
which the archaic and the modern, the Maghrebian and the European, encounter 
and challenge each other. They depict the way in which individuals marginalized by 
society, often young, subordinated women, struggle to construct their identities in 
a space described in his later novel Les Yeux baissés (1991) as “a third place” (un 
troisième lieu) between two cultures and two worlds (Ben Jelloun 1991, 295–296).20 
Growing up between two cultures means growing up between different narrative 
traditions, shaping one’s identity and life story in this ambivalent space. Whereas the 
protagonist of La réclusion solitaire, the guest worker Momo, has severe problems 
with overcoming the inhuman loneliness, alienation, and sense of exclusion in his 
new, inhospitable host country, the protagonist of Les yeux baissés, the young 
Berber girl Kniza who emigrates to France, weaves her own counter-stories that 
gradually help her gain distance to both cultures that surround her; she does not 
let the old stories “crush her” (Ben Jelloun 1991, 207). Ben Jelloun defends in his 
novels the right of each individual to tell his or her own story; and he sheds critical 
light on both the Arab countries and the racist West that violate this right in their 
own distinctive ways. 
In Tournier’s novels, too, the author is not the only narrator of counter-narratives: 
his novels are often about individuals who are in one way or another marginalized 
and who construct their own narrative order against the prevailing social order. For 
example, in Tournier’s novel Les Météores, uncle Alexandre constructs “his own 
universe” (Tournier 1975, 34) that opposes the heteronormative society, whereas 
the twins Jean and Paul build their own “twin cell” that questions the naturalness 
of the life form of “non-twins”. They speak their own counter-discourse that 
problematizes the representations produced by our society of homosexuals and 
twins. Of Tournier’s novels, it is, however, his second one, The Erl-King (Le Roi des 
Aulnes, 1970), which deals in the most explicit and complex manner with the role of 
cultural narratives in shaping our identities – on both individual and communal level. 
Accordingly, it is to this problematic that I will devote the final section of my essay.
Narrativity of identity in Tournier’s The Erl-King
The Erl-King tells the story of a car mechanic who believes he is “an ogre”, “a fabulous 
monster emerging from the mists of time” (Tournier 1972, 11/Tournier 1970, 11). His 
story is narrated from a double perspective, that is, both from an external third 
person perspective and from an internal first person perspective – through excerpts 
20 Ben Jelloun affirms in an interview that he tries to write from the perspective of those who 
suffer (Spear 1993, 41). Those are often the ones who are denied the right of speech, for as “the 
mother” asserts in Harrouda, “The tradition dictated me duties that I accomplished in silence. […] 
To dare to speak was already to exist, to become a person!” (“La tradition me dictait le devoir que 
j’accomplissais dans le silence. […] Oser la parole c’était déjà exister, devenir une personne!” Ben 
Jelloun 1973, 69).
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from his diary “Sinister writings of Abel Tiffauges”. At the beginning of the novel, 
Tiffauges runs a garage in the pre-World War II Paris, and tries to figure out who he 
is in relation to his childhood experiences at Saint Christopher’s boarding school. 
Then the war breaks out, and after working with carrier pigeons at the communica-
tions branch of the army, he is captured by the Germans and taken to a prisoner 
of war camp. As time goes by, the Nazis assign him more demanding duties, and 
eventually he assumes a leading role in Kaltenborn, a Prussian fortress that has 
been converted into a Napola, a Nazi elite military training school for young boys.
Tiffauges has always felt like an outsider, someone with difficulty finding his 
place in society, and he interprets his “abnormality” in terms of being “an ogre”, 
a descendant of mythical monster and giant figures. The novel focuses on the 
process in which he constructs his identity narratively by taking certain historical, 
mythical, and literary figures as his models. In his diary he tells that he started this 
process of “building up his own culture” already as a young boy: 
But here and there, leafing through dictionaries, picking up what I could in textbooks, 
watching out for fleeting allusions to what really interested me in French or history 
lessons, I started to build up a culture of my own, a personal Pantheon which included 
Alcibiades and Pontius Pilate, Caligula and Hadrian, Frederick William I and Barras, 
Talleyrand and Rasputin (Tournier 1972, 17).21 
Later he assumes especially various kinds of mythical monster, giant and carrier 
figures as his predecessors and models. These include for example Atlas, the Greek 
titan who carried the whole sky on his shoulders: “But the more I think of it, the 
more it seems to me that Atlas uranophorus, Atlas astrophorus is the mythological 
hero towards whom my life must tend, and in whom it must at last find its fulfilment 
and apotheosis” (Tournier 1972, 76).22 But as his ultimate model he venerates the 
mythical carrier figure of Saint Christopher. According to a medieval legend he was 
a giant who wanted to serve the greatest man on earth. He worked as a ferryman, 
and one day he carried across the river a child who weighed like a lump of lead on his 
shoulders and turned out to be the Christ Child. Accordingly, Tiffauges undertakes 
child-carrying as his ultimate mission and vocation. Already at Saint Christopher’s 
school the boys are taught to think of themselves as “Child-Bearers”, but Tiffauges 
makes this identity truly his own only later in his life. He unravels the etymology 
of the word ‘euphoria’, and finds that it means literally “carrying with happiness” 
as the Greek word ‘eu’ refers to happiness and ‘phoria’ has its origin in the verb 
meaning carrying. Following this insight he reinterprets his whole life in a new light: 
21 “Par bribes, en feuilletant les dictionnaires, en glanant ce que je pouvais dans des ouvrages 
de compilation scolaire, en guettant dans un cours d’histoire ou de français l’allusion fugitive à ce 
qui m’importait au premier chef, je commençai à me constituer une culture en marge, un panthéon 
personnel où voisinaient Alcibiade et Ponce Pilate, Caligula et Hadrien, Frédéric-Guillaume Ier et 
Barras, Talleyrand et Raspoutine” (Tournier 1970, 18–19).
22 “Mais plus j’y pense, plus il me semble qu’Atlas uranophore, Atlas astrophore est le héros 
mythologique vers lequel devrait tendre ma vie pour trouver en lui finalement son aboutissement et 
son apothéose” (Tournier 1970, 92).
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At this, a shaft of light suddenly falls on my past, my present, and, who knows, perhaps 
my future too. For this fundamental idea of portage, of phoria, is also found in the 
name of Christopher, the giant Christ-bearer […] and yet again it is embodied in the 
cars to which I reluctantly give the best of myself, but which even in their triviality are 
nonetheless instruments for the bearing of men, anthropophoric and therefore phoric 
par excellence (Tournier 1972, 74).23
This is a good example of the way Tiffauges constantly renarrates the story of his 
life by relating things that happen to him in the present to his past, which thereby 
gains new meaning. His diary plays an essential role in this reflective process: 
 “It may be that from now on there can’t even be a sequence of events in my life 
without that verbal reflection called diary” (Tournier 1972, 13).24
There are numerous different variants of carrier figures in The Erl-King, and 
one of the most important ones is the Erl-King who represents a kind of “negative 
inversion” of Saint Christopher. The Erl-King is a death figure best known by Goethe’s 
“Der Erlkönig” which, according to Tournier, “has always been the German poem 
par excellence for every French school-child embarking upon the study of German 
literature, a symbol of Germany itself” (Tournier 1988, 97). In The Erl-King, a Nazi 
Professor names a man, whose embalmed body is found in a peat-bog, the “Erl-
King”, and Tiffauges identifies strongly with this mythical figure; for him Goethe’s 
ballad appears as “the very charter of phoria”, which is “lifted to a paroxysm of 
incandescence by hyperborean magic” (Tournier 1972, 258).25 And when Tiffauges 
rides about Prussia on a horse named Bluebeard recruiting children for the Napola, 
it becomes evident that he is not so much a Saint Christopher carrying children to 
safety but more like an Erl-King wrenching children from their parents arms.
However, it is important that Tiffauges is an ambiguous figure who is not clearly 
good nor evil.26 He does not have a pre-given essence that would determine his 
identity but is, on the contrary, constituted in time on the basis of interpreting the 
situations he faces and acting in them. The reader has to participate in this inter-
pretative process by constantly re-evaluating whether Tiffauges is a “good” or a 
 “bad” carrier, a Saint Christopher or an Erl-King figure. And as the novel proceeds, 
23 “Et là, un trait de lumière illumine soudain mon passé, mon présent et, qui sait, mon avenir 
peut-être aussi. Car cette idée fondamentale de portage, de phorie, elle se trouve aussi dans le 
nom même de Christophe, le géant Porte-Christ, […] de même encore qu’elle s’incarne à nouveau 
dans ces automobiles auxquelles je consacre en renâclant le meilleur de moi-même, mais qui n’en 
sont pas moins dans leur trivilialité l’instrument porteur d’homme, anthropophore, phorique par 
excellence” (Tournier 1970, 90).
24 “Les événements de ma vie ne peuvent-ils plus se succéder désormais sans ce reflet verbal 
qu’on appelle un journal” (Tournier 1970, 14).
25 “[C]’est la charte même de la phorie qu’elle élève à la troisième puissance. C’est le mythe latin 
de Christophe-Albuquerque porté à un paroxysme d’incandescence par la magie hyperboréenne” 
(Tournier 1970, 318).
26 In fact most of the giant-carriers in the novel are somehow ambivalent figures, for there is 
something monsterlike (or “ogrish”) in their gianthood. As Mikhail Bakhtin has shown in his famous 
study on Rabelais (1984, 24–27, 341–344) giants are typically ambivalent figures in folklore and 
world literature in general. On the ethical ambiguity of the monster imagery in The Erl-King, see 
Meretoja (2004b).
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it becomes increasingly evident that he is a morally ambiguous figure, who has the 
potential for both good and evil, like all of us.27 
The Erl-King manifests the hermeneutic idea that there is a dialectical 
relationship between the cultural tradition and the individual who interprets his life 
in the light of the stories handed down by the tradition. In the novel, myths do not 
provide ready-made identities but only material for their construction. Tiffauges 
is a modern individual to whom self-identity is not automatically given but is, on 
the contrary, something that he must construct for himself.28 Consequently, in the 
novel the individual subject is not a self-sufficient source of meaning, but neither is 
it reduced to those meaning systems that form the basis of its constitution. Rather, 
the relationship between the individual and the cultural system appears as dialogical 
in the sense described by Taylor, who has analysed the “dialogical nature of the 
self” with reference to the way we are constituted in conversation with “significant 
others” (Taylor 1996, 35; Taylor 1991, 311–314; see also Berger & Luckmann 1966, 
152–172, 178–180). In Tiffauges’s case this conversation must be understood in an 
extended sense; his significant others are mythical models that he has chosen as 
his interlocutors from a vast cultural tradition rather than from his immediate social 
environment. 
Tournier obviously thinks that in the modern world myths do not have only a 
social, adaptive function, as in traditional societies, but they can also function 
as tools for the individual’s construction of his or her private, personal universe 
of meaning. Thus, culturally transmitted narratives do not appear as necessar-
ily repressive but as having also emancipatory potential for the individual. As we 
have seen, history and literary tradition provide Tiffauges material for building his 
own culture. Hermeneuticists, such as Gadamer and Ricoeur, have stressed that 
the emancipatory potential of literary narratives resides precisely in the way in 
which they disclose new possibilities of being and acting that enable us to take 
critical distance to ourselves and to our social environment (see Gadamer 1993, 
478; Ricoeur 1991a, 37, 66, 300–301; Madison 1990, 94–96).29 Ricoeur (1991a, 
88) argues that as we expose ourselves to a world proposed by a literary text, 
we encounter “imaginative variations” of ourselves. Thereby our views on how we 
can live our lives, who we are, and who we want to be, are enlarged and enriched 
27 This ambiguity is emphasized also by his name: Abel refers to the biblical nomad who was 
murdered by his brother, whereas Tiffauges is the name of the castle where Gilles de Rais, the 
child-murderer who is in the Breton tradition regarded as the historical model of Charles Perrault’s 
Bluebeard, committed his hideous crimes (see Cloonan 1985, 47–48). Tournier (1970, 102) thinks 
that phoria itself is essentially ambivalent: “He who carries [porter] the child carries him away 
[emporter]. […] In other words, the ghost of Saint Christopher, bearer and saviour of children, is 
the erlking, abductor and murderer of children. All the mystery and profundity of phoria lies in this 
ambiguity”.
28 As Giddens (1991, 32) writes, in modern, post-traditional societies self-identity becomes “a re-
flexive project”. 
29 Gadamer (1993, 204) argues that encountering foreign worlds of meaning (such as literary 
worlds) enables us to ”take a critical stance towards every convention”; and Ricoeur (1991a, 6) 
contends that “in one way or another all symbol systems contribute to shaping reality”, but especially 
art has power to “disturb and rearrange our relation to the real world”.
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(see e.g. Ricoeur 1991a, 66, 88).30 Furthermore, hermeneuticists do not consider 
symbolic systems in general to be necessarily violent in the manner in which many 
“post-structuralists” (see e.g. Derrida 1967, 112) frequently do, because herme-
neuticists stress the role of the active individual interpretation in all constitution 
of meaning: no symbolic system can determine mechanically the processes of 
meaning-giving, which always include a moment of application. Thus, as Gadamer 
(1993, 8; see also 1997, 297) puts it, understanding is ”always-understanding- 
differently” (Immer-anders-Verstehen). From this perspective, what is crucial is the 
way in which cultural narratives are understood and applied.
This is a central theme in Tournier’s The Erl-King, in which the potential dangers 
in the application of myths are delineated against the historical background of Nazi 
Germany. The novel shows that we can bear responsibility for our mythical con-
structions only insofar as we are aware of their constructed nature. When their 
cultural constructedness is disguised, narrative identities can become reified with 
devastating consequences, as in Nazi Germany.31 In the novel, Tiffauges ends up 
building a personal mythological universe that resembles alarmingly the universe 
of Nazi mythology. However, what crucially unites Tiffauges and the Nazis and 
what is troubling in Tiffauges is not the fact that he uses cultural narratives to 
construct his identity and his own meaningful order, but rather the fact that he does 
not see them as cultural constructions. Both Tiffauges and the Nazis reify their 
mythological systems by believing that they reflect some pre-given divine order or 
inevitable destiny for which they are not responsible. 
Above we saw that according to Ricoeur narrative reinterpretation of one’s 
life implies positing oneself as its responsible subject. Tiffauges’s case, however, 
shows that the narrativity of identity does not in itself necessarily lead to taking 
responsibility of one’s life story. Instead, the novel suggests that such responsibility 
requires critical awareness of one’s active role in narrativizing one’s identity. In 
other words, it shows why it is important that we are conscious of narratives as 
narratives, that is, as cultural constructions that have no absolute basis. All in all, 
Tournier’s novels express the view that we cannot get rid of narratives but neither 
can we take them for granted; instead, they should be subject to continuous critical 
discussion and reflection. This requires also acknowledging the fundamental histo-
ricity of cultural narratives, that is, the fact that they exist only through a process of 
continuous reinterpretation and can always be transformed by new interpretations.
30 In his Soi-mème comme un autre (1990) Ricoeur highlights the ethical dimension of the narrative 
constitution of identity and reminds us that narratives are never ethically neutral: they always transmit 
certain values and ideals as well as certain visions of good life and justice (Ricoeur 1990, 139). 
Narratives can also call us for responsibility and provoke us to “be and to act otherwise” (Ricoeur 
1985, 447).
31 Reification is a Marxist term which, as Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966, 106) explain, 
refers to the “apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or 
possibly suprahuman terms”. Accordingly, identities become reified when they are apprehended “as 
an inevitable fate, for which the individual may disclaim responsibility” (108).
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Conclusion: Critical appropriation of Narrativity
To conclude, I hope to have shown that the so-called narrative turn of the French 
novel involves consciousness of the human constructedness of narratives, which 
was something that the nouveaux romanciers, too, wanted to underline. As a con-
sequence, the return of the narrative does not entail a return to nineteenth-century 
realism in which narrative orders were thought to reflect order found in reality itself. 
We can say that after the nouveau roman narratives have lost their innocence: they 
are conscious of their own narrative nature, of their historicity, and of the way they 
represent only one possible – inevitably ethically and politically charged – perspec-
tive into reality. Without the nouveau roman’s struggle against the myth of natural-
ness this self-consciousness would hardly be as acute. 
The “return of the narrative” means accepting that although narratives do not 
reflect order that could be found in reality as such, but manifest human modes of 
giving it shape, narrativity is an essential structure of human existence, and thus it 
is a legitimate task for the novel to engage in storytelling. This view, which became 
widespread by the end of the twentieth century, is based on apprehending our 
relation to the world in hermeneutic rather than structuralist or positivistic terms.32 
From the horizon of the “return of the narrative”, the emancipatory task of litera-
ture does not mean trying to emancipate the reader from narratives into something 
more real, but, instead, promoting a more authentic, critical and reflected relation 
to narrative orders, including awareness of the historical processes and power 
relations in which they are entangled. Furthermore, literary narratives can provide 
the reader alternative possibilities of being and thereby a wider horizon for the con-
struction of his or her own narrative identity. In sum, by making storytelling thematic 
and by telling counter-narratives that question prevailing models of sense-making, 
the novelists of the “narrative turn” promote critical reflection on the narratives on 
the basis of which we orient to the world and narrate our lives – both as individuals 
and as communities.
32 In addition, it should be noted that in the 1980s the nouveaux romanciers, too, contributed to the 
rehabilitation of the narrative by writing autobiographical novels that – although far from traditional 
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